Swedish Patent Litigation in Comparison to European

PublikationArtikel (med peer review)
Anna Horn, Bengt Domeij, Financing of Innovations, Företagandets villkor, Innovation, Juridik, Patent, Per-Olof Bjuggren, Rättsekonomi

Sammanfattning

Exclusivity and transferability are the main characteristics of a private property right. The owner of a private property right has the legal rights to exclude others from its use, to appropriate the income emanating from its use and to sell it on whatever terms he and the buyer find agreeable. Insecure property rights discourage investors from investing. Property rights in ideas are called intellectual property rights. Intellectual property rights have a public good attribute. The protected information can be consumed by many at the same time. In order to give incentive to invest in innovations the use of the innovative idea has to be restricted (made exclusive). Without a possibility for an entrepreneur to charge for the use of innovative ideas there would be weak investment incentives. A patent is the intellectual property that intends to give an exclusive and transferable right to innovative technical ideas.
However, for a property right to be excludable and transferable it is crucial that it is well defined and legally enforceable. In this sense a patent differs from property rights to physical assets as e.g. ownership to land. To legally defend patents from infringements is costly and often results in a judicial decision that declares the patent invalid (revocation). In other words there is an uncertainty in the definition of the intellectual property right that makes the enforcement of patents costly. This transaction cost differs between jurisdictions. This paper studies different aspects of the legal enforceability of patents. More specifically we study how factors as legal costs, potential damages, duration of legal disputes, percentage of court decisions resulting in infringement or revocation differ between jurisdictions and are likely to affect the decisions of patentees to settle or to rely on a court decision. Litigation data from five different European jurisdictions is used.

Bjuggren, P-O., Domeij, B. & Horn, A. (2015). Swedish Patent Litigation in Comparison to European. Nordisk Immateriellt Rättsskydd, 2015(5), 504-522.


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Publicerat i

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Sammanfattning

There has been a shift in innovation policy in recent years toward more focus on systemic transformation and changed directionality. In this chapter, we describe a collection of challenges that such policies need to address. Based on a review of dominant frameworks regarding socio-technical transitions, we compare these theories with examples of innovation policy in different countries. Systemic transformation across an economy usually requires a process of creative destruction in which new competencies may be required, actors need to be connected in novel ways, and institutions may need to be changed. Our empirical illustrations show that support programs and initiatives across Europe do not always seem to result in such a process, as they include mechanisms favoring large, established firms and universities. These actors have often fine-tuned their activities and capabilities to the existing order, and therefore have few incentives to engage in renewal. As the incumbent actors also control superior financial and relational resources, there is a risk that they captivate innovation policies and thus reinforce established structures rather than contributing to systemic transformation.

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