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Äganderätten i den nationalekonomiska forskarutbildningen

PublicationBook chapter
Äganderätt, Dan Johansson, Företagandets villkor, Forskarutbildning, Nationalekonomi

Abstract

Related content: Working Paper No. 76

Johansson, D. (2005). “Äganderätten i den nationalekonomiska forskarutbildningen.” In Berggren, N. & Karlson, N. (Eds.) Äganderättens konsekvenser och grunder (pp. 110–124). Stockholm: Ratio.


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