Municipally Owned Enterprises as Danger Zones for Corruption? How Politicians Having Feet in Two Camps May Undermine Conditions for Accountability

PublicationArticle (with peer review)

Anders Gustafsson, Andreas Bergh, Bolagsstyrning, Emanuel Wittberg, Företagandets villkor, Gissur Ó. Erlingsson, IFN, Jönköping International Business School, Kommun, Linköpings universitet, Nationalekonomi, Politisk ekonomi, Statsvetenskap

Abstract

The market-inspired reforms of New Public Management have been particularly pronounced in Swedish local government. Notably, municipally owned enterprises (MOEs) have rapidly grown in numbers. Principal-agent theory gives rise to the hypothesis that the massive introduction of MOEs has impacted negatively on the conditions for accountability in Swedish local government. To study this, social network analysis was employed in mapping networks for 223 MOEs in 11 strategically chosen municipalities, covering a total of 732 politicians. The analysis reveals substantial overlaps between principals (representatives of the ultimate stakeholders, citizens) and agents (the boards of the MOEs). Hence, corporatization of public services seems to imply worrisome entanglements between the politicians who are set to steer, govern, and oversee MOEs on the one hand, and the board members of MOEs on the other. The increasing numbers of MOEs may therefore have adverse effects on accountability in important and growing parts of Swedish local government.

Bergh, A., Erlingsson, G., Gustafsson, A. & Wittberg, E. (2019). Municipally Owned Enterprises as Danger Zones for Corruption? How Politicians Having Feet in Two Camps May Undermine Conditions for Accountability. Public Integrity. DOI: 10.1080/10999922.2018.1522182

Ratio Working Paper No 343: Populism, Liberalism and the Quest for Meaning and Community

Working paperPublication

Karlson, N.

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Publication year

2020

Abstract

Liberalism is losing ground, while populist or even authoritarian nationalist regimes are on the rise. This paper argues that the causes of the decline are, at least partly, endogenous, that a narrow focus on economic efficiency and the successful critique of socialism and the welfare state have created an idea vacuum that has opened up for these illiberal tendencies. The conclusion is that a central challenge for liberalism is to offer a comprehensive idea and narrative about meaning and community that is not socialistic, conservative or nationalistic, but distinctly liberal, to counter these developments.

Hur många jobb med jobbskatteavdraget?

Article (without peer review)Publication

Lundberg, J.

Publication year

2020

Published in

Ekonomisk Debatt

Abstract

Enligt ekonomisk teori kommer fler att vara villiga att arbeta ju större den finansiella vinsten av att arbeta är. I Sverige är deltagandeskatten över 80 procent för normala lönelägen, vilket innebär att staten får den allra största delen av värdet av att någon börjar arbeta. Empirisk forskning ger stöd för att högre deltagandeskatt leder till lägre sysselsättning, med starkare effekter för kvinnor med barn. Med hjälp av denna forskning kan man dra slutsatser om jobbskatteavdragets sysselsättningseffekt, som uppskattas till 94 000–180 000 personer.

Subsidy Entrepreneurs: An Inquiry into firms seeking public grants

Article (in press)Publication

Halvarsson, D, Gustafsson, A. & Gustavsson Tingvall, P.

Publication year

2020

Published in

Journal of Industry Competition and Trade

Abstract

This paper studies the incentives and characteristics of firms that apply for, and eventually receive, one or multiple governmental grants intended to stimulate innovation and growth. The analysis departs from a contest model in which entrepreneurs are free to allocate their effort between production and seeking grants. The results suggest that highly productive entrepreneurs abstain from seeking grants, moderately productive firms allocate a share of their effort to grant seeking, and low-productivity firms allocate most resources to seeking grants. Due to their efforts in seeking grants, these low-productive subsidy entrepreneurs also have a relatively high probability of receiving the grants. Using comprehensive data over grants from the three largest grant-distributing agencies in Sweden, we find concordant evidence of a negative relation between the probability of receiving a grant and firm productivity. As we go from single- to multiple-grant-supported firms, this negative relation becomes more pronounced.

Abstract

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