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Verktyg att välja: en budgetpolitisk beslutsmodell

PublicationReports
Företagandets villkor, Niclas Berggren, Valfrihet

Abstract

Utmaningen för den ekonomiska politiken är att undvika kortsiktighet och inflytande för särintressen. Dessa utmaningar är numera, efter reformeringen av budgetprocessen, lättare att hantera. Trots reformerna under 1990-talet behövs ytterligare åtgärder för att förbättra det ekonomisk-politiska beslutsfattandet.

I denna utredning presenteras en enkel och tillämpbar analysmodell – välfärdsmatrisen. Utgångspunkten för välfärdsmatrisen är att i högre grad än idag främja det långsiktiga allmänintresset, genom att gynna både välstånd och rättvisa. För att nå ett sådant mål krävs att beslutsunderlagen speglar en åtgärds samtliga effekter, inte minst de dynamiska aspekterna är väsentliga för att rätt kunna värdera en åtgärd. I utredningen understryks också att ett alternativ till en åtgärd är att inte vidta någon åtgärd alls.

Behovet av ett mer rigoröst institutionellt regelverk som omgärdar det ekonomisk-politiska beslutsfattandet är också stort. I utredningen presenteras några förslag till institutionella reformer som bland annat ökar möjligheten att fatta beslut som främjar långsiktigheten framför kortsiktigheten.

Berggren, N. (2002). Verktyg att välja: en budgetpolitisk beslutsmodell. Stockholm: Reforminstitutet.

Based on content

Working Paper No. 166. “Time for behavioral political economy? An analysis of articles in behavioral economics?”
Working paperPublication
Berggren, N.
Publication year

2011

Published in

Ratio Working Paper

Abstract

This study analyzes leading research in behavioral economics to see whether it contains advocacy of paternalism and whether it addresses the potential cognitive limitations and biases of the policymakers who are going to implement paternalist policies. The findings reveal that 20.7% of the studied articles in behavioral economics propose paternalist policy action and that 95.5% of these do not contain any analysis of the cognitive ability of policymakers. This suggests that behavioral political economy, in which the analytical tools of behavioral economics are applied to political decision-makers as well, would offer a useful extension of the research program. Such an extension could be related to the concept of robust political economy, according to which the case for paternalism should be subjected to “worst-case” assumptions, such as policymakers being less than fully rational.

Working Paper No. 166. “Time for behavioral political economy? An analysis of articles in behavioral economics?”
Working paperPublication
Berggren, N.
Publication year

2011

Published in

Ratio Working Paper

Abstract

This study analyzes leading research in behavioral economics to see whether it contains advocacy of paternalism and whether it addresses the potential cognitive limitations and biases of the policymakers who are going to implement paternalist policies. The findings reveal that 20.7% of the studied articles in behavioral economics propose paternalist policy action and that 95.5% of these do not contain any analysis of the cognitive ability of policymakers. This suggests that behavioral political economy, in which the analytical tools of behavioral economics are applied to political decision-makers as well, would offer a useful extension of the research program. Such an extension could be related to the concept of robust political economy, according to which the case for paternalism should be subjected to “worst-case” assumptions, such as policymakers being less than fully rational.

Choosing One’s Own Informal Institutions
Article (with peer review)Publication
Berggren, N.
Publication year

2009

Abstract

In the main, Hayek favored rules that apply equally to all and located such rules in tradition, beyond conscious construction. This led Hayek to attack Keynes’s immoralism, i.e., the position that one should be free to choose how to lead one’s life irrespective of the informal institutions in place. However, it is argued here that immoralism may be compatible with Hayek’s enterprise since Hayek misinterpreted Keynes, who did not advocate the dissolving of all informal rules for everybody. By avoiding this misinterpretation, immoralism can be seen as institutional experimentation at the margin, which Hayek himself favored.

Related content: Working Paper No. 118

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