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Ratio Working Paper No. 199. Does fiscal decentralization foster regional investment in productive infrastructure?

PublicationWorking paper
Albert Solé-Ollé, Andreas Kappeler, Andreas Stephan, Fiscal federalism, Företagandets villkor, Regionala investeringar, Timo Välilä
Ratio Working Paper No. 199
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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to analyze the effect of revenue decentralization on the provision of infrastructure at the sub-national level. We estimate the effects of revenue decentralization and earmarked grant financing on the level of sub-national infrastructure investment in 20 European countries over the period 1990-2009. The results are interpreted in light of the predictions of the theory on fiscal federalism. We find that it is sub-national infrastructure investment that increases after revenue decentralization and not investment in redistribution. However, the effect of revenue decentralization is lower the higher the use of earmarked grants to fund infrastructure investment.

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Kappeler, A., Solé-Ollé, A., Stephan, A. & Välilä, T. (2012). Does fiscal decentralization foster regional investment in productive infrastructure? Ratio Working Paper No. 199.

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Ratio Working Paper No. 199. Does fiscal decentralization foster regional investment in productive infrastructure?
Working paperPublication
Kappeler, A., Solé-Ollé, A., Stephan, A. & Välilä, T.
Publication year

2012

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to analyze the effect of revenue decentralization on the provision of infrastructure at the sub-national level. We estimate the effects of revenue decentralization and earmarked grant financing on the level of sub-national infrastructure investment in 20 European countries over the period 1990-2009. The results are interpreted in light of the predictions of the theory on fiscal federalism. We find that it is sub-national infrastructure investment that increases after revenue decentralization and not investment in redistribution. However, the effect of revenue decentralization is lower the higher the use of earmarked grants to fund infrastructure investment.

Related content: Does fiscal decentralization foster regional investment in productive infrastructure?

Ratio Working Paper No. 199. Does fiscal decentralization foster regional investment in productive infrastructure?
Working paperPublication
Kappeler, A., Solé-Ollé, A., Stephan, A. & Välilä, T.
Publication year

2012

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to analyze the effect of revenue decentralization on the provision of infrastructure at the sub-national level. We estimate the effects of revenue decentralization and earmarked grant financing on the level of sub-national infrastructure investment in 20 European countries over the period 1990-2009. The results are interpreted in light of the predictions of the theory on fiscal federalism. We find that it is sub-national infrastructure investment that increases after revenue decentralization and not investment in redistribution. However, the effect of revenue decentralization is lower the higher the use of earmarked grants to fund infrastructure investment.

Related content: Does fiscal decentralization foster regional investment in productive infrastructure?

Ratio Working Paper No. 349: Industrial conflict in essential services in a new era – Swedish rules in a comparative perspective
Working paperPublication
Karlson, N.
Publication year

2021

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Ratio Working Paper

Abstract

This paper examines whether the Swedish regulatory system of dealing with industrial conflicts that affect essential services need an update or reform. Are the existing rules effective in a world where many essential services are upheld by many interdependent agents in complex systems where every single node becomes critical for the functioning of the system, and where the essential service activities could be either private or public? A comparative study is conducted with the corresponding regulatory systems of the United Kingdom, Germany, and Denmark.
The conclusion is that Sweden is a special case. The Swedish protection against and readiness in dealing with societally harmful industrial conflicts in essential services is weaker than in the countries of comparison. Just as in relation to other threats to essential services, it is not sustainable to claim that just because such a threat is not currently present, there would be no need for preparedness.
There are many alternative ways to handle this. Desirable methods should both prevent harmful conflicts from erupting and end conflicts that have grown harmful to society at a later stage. The labour market organisations should have a mutual interest in reforming the rules.

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