Var gör innovationsstöd mest nytta?

Företagandets villkor, Företagsstöd, Patrik Gustavsson Tingvall, Tillväxtanalys, Vinnova


Rapporten är en effektutvärdering av “VINN NU och Forska & Väx” som administreras av Sveriges innovationsmyndighet, Vinnova. I rapporten, som är författad av Patrik Gustavsson Tingvall med understöd av Josefin Videnord, undersöks dessutom om effekten av dessa program skiljer sig åt mellan regioner. Rapporten ger även rekommendationer om hur stöden kan fördelas för att bättre generera tillväxt.

Gustavsson Tingvall, P. (2015). Var gör innovationsstöd mest nytta? Stora skillnader i effekt mellan olika regioner. PM 2015:17. Tillväxtanalys.

Liknande innehåll

Subsidy Entrepreneurs: An Inquiry into firms seeking public grants
Artikel (in press)Publikation
Halvarsson, D, Gustafsson, A. & Gustavsson Tingvall, P.



This paper studies the incentives and characteristics of firms that apply for, and eventually receive, one or multiple governmental grants intended to stimulate innovation and growth. The analysis departs from a contest model in which entrepreneurs are free to allocate their effort between production and seeking grants. The results suggest that highly productive entrepreneurs abstain from seeking grants, moderately productive firms allocate a share of their effort to grant seeking, and low-productivity firms allocate most resources to seeking grants. Due to their efforts in seeking grants, these low-productive subsidy entrepreneurs also have a relatively high probability of receiving the grants. Using comprehensive data over grants from the three largest grant-distributing agencies in Sweden, we find concordant evidence of a negative relation between the probability of receiving a grant and firm productivity. As we go from single- to multiple-grant-supported firms, this negative relation becomes more pronounced.

Direct and indirect effects of private- and government-sponsored venture capital
Artikel (med peer review)Publikation
Engberg, E., Gustavsson Tingvall, P. & Halvarsson, D.


Publicerat i

Starting from the discourse on the impact of private and governmental venture capital investments, we examine the effects of different types of venture capital on firms’ sales, employment and investment. Our results show that both private and governmental venture capital investments boost firm sales with a delay of 2–3 years. The results suggest that VC impacts sales primarily through efficiency gains and to some extent, investments in physical capital investments, whereas no employment effects can be traced. Finally, we find indications of governmental VC investors being more prone to make follow-up investments in stagnating, non-growing firms than private investors.

Industrial policy: Political considerations, payoffs, and peculiar incentives
Gustafsson, A


Publicerat i

This thesis consists of four independent papers. They deal with some aspects of industrial policy, namely public supports to firms that are intended to support innovation and growth at the firm level, using Swedish data. Two papers study the efficiency of current Swedish policies by estimating the effects of subsidies and public loans to firms, respectively.
The results on subsidized firms suggests that there are some positive effects on profits and productivity, but these diminish and disappear over time. The results of public loans are more positive with long lasting effects on productivity and sales but only for smaller firms. Public loans do not lead to an increase in the number of employees in the firms that receive them.
The third paper studies the selection of firms for subsidies and the incentives firms have to seek them. By modeling the decision to seek subsidies as a trade off between producing in the market and seeking grants, the results suggest that firms with low market productivity might self-select into seeking grants. The empirical results are in line with the theoretical predictions.
The final paper studies the incentives that politicians have to implement programs and policies that they know will be inefficient. Since a lack of political action can make the politicians look incompetent, incumbentens have incentives to implement policies even though they know that these will be ineffective, to signal competence towards the voters.

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