Den borgerliga kulturen skapade den industriella revolutionen

PublikationArtikel (utan peer review)
Anders Gustafsson, Deirdre McCloskey, Ekonomisk utveckling, Företagandets villkor


Utdrag: Den tredje och sista delen i Deidre McCloskeys serie “The Bourgeois Era” är till slut klar. Boken är en rejäl tegelsten och ännu längre än de föregående två böckerna (McCloskey 2006, 2010). Medan den första volymen behandlade vilka dygder som är nödvändiga för ett borgerligt samhälle, och den andra visade att traditionella teorier inte tillräckligt väl kan förklara den industriella revolutionen, är temat för den tredje boken McCloskeys egen förklaring till den enorma ekonomiska utveckling som skett de senaste 300 åren.

Läs hela recensionen via länken i titeln.

Gustafsson, A. (2017). Den borgerliga kulturen skapade den industriella revolutionen. [Bokrecension av Bourgeois Equality: How Ideas, Not Capital or Institutions, Enriched the World, av D. N. McCloskey]. Ekonomisk Debatt 45(5), 83-85.

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