Sök

Organisationsförändringar och ökad kommunal korruption

PublikationArtikel (med peer review)
Företagandets villkor, Gissur Ó. Erlingsson, Kommun, Offentlig korruption

Sammanfattning

Since the mid 1990s there has been an increased focus in media on public scandals in Swedish municipalities. This essay sets out to elucidate if there are reasons to believe that public corruption in Swedish municipalities is in fact increasing. By applying instruments from the institutional rational-choice genre, and by illustrating the main argument with empirical illustrations, the author draws the conclusion that there are compelling reasons to believe that organisational reforms during the last two decades – i.e. new public management – have shaped an incentive-structure which favours corrupt activities, hence supposedly increasing their frequency. The essay concludes with a tentative discussion on reform-strategies to counteract increasing corruption, and calls for extensive research on the under-researched topic.

Erlingsson, G.Ó. (2006). ”Organisationsförändringar och ökad kommunal korruption: Existerar ett samband?”Kommunal ekonomi och politik, 8(3): 7-36.

Baserat på innehåll

Why Do Party Systems Tend to Be So Stable?
Artikel (med peer review)Publikation
Erlingsson, G.Ó.
Publiceringsår

2009

Publicerat i

Bifröst Journal of Social Science

Sammanfattning

The purpose of this research note is to demonstrate the usefulness of rational choice models in making party‐system stability intelligible. First, the ‘problem of collective action among potential party‐entrepreneurs’ makes it puzzling that new political parties emerge at all. Secondly, if the original collective‐action problem is overcome somehow, the ‘problem of voter coordination’ makes it hard for new parties to attract voters. Finally, established competitors have incentives and resources to hold newcomers back. I conclude by maintaining that simple, well‐known rational choice models explain the empirical observation by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) that party systems tend to be ‘frozen’. Instead, the genuinely puzzling thing is why new political parties emerge and gain support at all.

Varför bildas nya partier?
Artikel (med peer review)Publikation
Erlingsson, G.Ó.
Publiceringsår

2006

Sammanfattning

Why do people engage in high-cost political activities such as forming new political parties? Start-up costs are high. Moreover, rewards are unclear and uncertain. Since political parties are collective goods, people demanding new political parties face a collective action problem. It is therefore somewhat puzzling that new parties emerge. Drawing on theories from economics, sociology and political science, I argue that we, in order to understand the emergence of new parties, need to analytically move in on party-entrepreneurs to elucidate what motivates them. Methodologically inspired by the debate on bridging the gap between deductive and inductive strategies, I process-trace and compare theree cases. The case studies identify individual level-mechanisms producing the decision to form a new party. People that voice demands within established parties, and face outright rejection, have experienced bad treatment from established politicians. These experiences contribute to disappointment, anger, and a sense of indignation – i.e. “intense emotions” – that mobilize entrepreneurs. Intense emotions create a lust for revenge, which becomes a psychological selective incentive, and is important for understanding why people engage themselves in high-cost political activities.

Related content: Working Paper No. 115

Modelling Secessions from Municipalities
Artikel (med peer review)Publikation
Erlingsson, G.Ó.
Publiceringsår

2005

Sammanfattning

Under what conditions are quests for secession successful? Current debates in Scandinavia on the appropriate size of municipalities are taken as a point of departure for answering this question. I set out to analyse what processes are triggered through mergers of small political units into larger ones. The Swedish experience is analysed as an empirical illustration. A game-theoretical model is constructed, in which I highlight questions of ideology, power and strategy when analysing secessions. I conclude that mergers, such as those in Sweden between 1952 and 1974, create a built-in conflict in the larger unit. Certain geographical parts of the political unit get the worst of it in a conflict concerning resources, which will create tension based on geographical location. If these conflicts are not solved, questions of secession will inevitably be raised. In the Swedish context the law is phrased in such a way that the government decides whether or not secession will be allowed. The game-theoretical model therefore suggests that campaigns for secession will be successful if the seceding part (SP) (a) meets the required physical criteria (which concern size and financial predisposition), (b) the quest for secession enjoys strong public support and (c) the party in government takes a benevolent view of municipality separations.

Visa fler

Ratio är ett fristående forskningsinstitut som forskar om hur företagandets villkor kan utvecklas och förbättras.

Sveavägen 59 4trp

Box 3203

103 64 Stockholm

Postgiro: 382621-1

|

Bankgiro: 512-6578