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Revenues as Proxy for Profits

PublikationArtikel (med peer review)
Företagandets villkor, Niklas Rudholm, Sven-Olov Daunfeldt

Sammanfattning

In the entry literature, researchers sometimes use revenues as a proxy for profits because this is the only data available. Doing so could seriously bias the results.

Daunfeldt, S-O., & Rudholm, N. (2009). “Revenues as Proxy for Profits: A Cautionary Note.”Applied Economic Letters, 16(7): 679–681.


Liknande innehåll

Working Paper no. 328 Wholesale firms: A catalyst for Swedish exports?
Working paperPublikation
Daunfeldt, S-O., Engberg, E., Halvarsson, D., Kokko, A. & Tingvall, P.
Publiceringsår

2019

Publicerat i

Ratio Working Paper

Sammanfattning

This paper examines the role of wholesale firms as facilitators of exports for small and medium-sized Swedish businesses. Our findings suggest that wholesale firms do facilitate access to difficult markets located outside Europe. For exports of a particular good to a given market, we observe a positive correlation between the export volumes of wholesale and manufacturing firms. Finally, we present evidence that supports a prediction from recent trade models with differentiated firms, namely that wholesale firms can facilitate exports for firms that are not themselves capable of direct exports.

A revised perspective on innovation policy for renewal of mature economies – Historical evidence from finance and telecommunications in Sweden 1980–1990
Artikel (med peer review)Publikation
Eriksson, K., Ernkvist, M., Laurell, C., Moodysson, J., Nykvist, R. & Sandström, C.
Publiceringsår

2019

Sammanfattning

What is the role of innovation policy for accomplishing renewal of mature industries in Western economies? Drawing upon an unusually rich dataset spanning 9752 digitized archival documents, we categorize and code decisions taken by policymakers on several levels while also mapping and quantifying the strategic activities of both entrant firms and incumbent monopolists over a decade. Our data concerns two empirical cases from Sweden during the time period 1980–1990: the financial sector and the telecommunications sector. In both industries, a combination of technological and institutional upheaval came into motion during this time period which in turn fueled the revitalization of the Swedish economy in the subsequent decades. Our findings show that Swedish policymakers in both cases consistently acted in order to promote the emergence of more competition and de novo entrant firms at the expense of established monopolies. The paper quantifies and documents this process while also highlighting several enabling conditions. In conclusion, the results indicate that successful innovation policy in mature economies is largely a matter of strategically dealing with resourceful vested interest groups, alignment of expectations, and removing resistance to industrial renewal.

Municipally Owned Enterprises as Danger Zones for Corruption? How Politicians Having Feet in Two Camps May Undermine Conditions for Accountability
Artikel (med peer review)Publikation
Bergh, A., Erlingsson, G., Gustafsson, A. & Wittberg, E.
Publiceringsår

2019

Publicerat i
Sammanfattning

The market-inspired reforms of New Public Management have been particularly pronounced in Swedish local government. Notably, municipally owned enterprises (MOEs) have rapidly grown in numbers. Principal-agent theory gives rise to the hypothesis that the massive introduction of MOEs has impacted negatively on the conditions for accountability in Swedish local government. To study this, social network analysis was employed in mapping networks for 223 MOEs in 11 strategically chosen municipalities, covering a total of 732 politicians. The analysis reveals substantial overlaps between principals (representatives of the ultimate stakeholders, citizens) and agents (the boards of the MOEs). Hence, corporatization of public services seems to imply worrisome entanglements between the politicians who are set to steer, govern, and oversee MOEs on the one hand, and the board members of MOEs on the other. The increasing numbers of MOEs may therefore have adverse effects on accountability in important and growing parts of Swedish local government.

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