Sök

Working Paper No. 1. The Frailty of Economic Reforms: Political Logic and Constitutional Lessons

PublikationWorking paper
Företagandets villkor, Niclas Berggren, Skattereform
Working Paper No. 1.
Ladda ner

Sammanfattning

Why are efficiency-enhancing reforms often frail and subject to being undermined over time? Two theories are examined: public-choice theory, which explains this as the possible result of a need, from time to time, to wipe the slate clean in order to retain productivity in the distribution of favors to interest groups, and a theory which acknowledges that politicians may implement reforms for ideological reasons but still, as time passes, be influenced by the logic of the political and media systems to abandon their initial aspirations. In any case, the demise of reforms is partly a function of the constitutional setting: rules which encourage shortsightedness and easy satisfaction of interest-group agendas make it difficult for decision-makers to withstand pressure for legislative change. Avenues to mitigate these problems through constitutional reforms are explored.

Berggren, N. (2003). The Frailty of Economic Reforms: Political Logic and Constitutional Lessons. Ratio Working Paper No. 1.

Baserat på innehåll

Working Paper No. 1. The Frailty of Economic Reforms: Political Logic and Constitutional Lessons
Working paperPublikation
Berggren, N
Publiceringsår

2002

Sammanfattning

Why are efficiency-enhancing reforms often frail and subject to being undermined over time? Two theories are examined: public-choice theory, which explains this as the possible result of a need, from time to time, to wipe the slate clean in order to retain productivity in the distribution of favors to interest groups, and a theory which acknowledges that politicians may implement reforms for ideological reasons but still, as time passes, be influenced by the logic of the political and media systems to abandon their initial aspirations. In any case, the demise of reforms is partly a function of the constitutional setting: rules which encourage shortsightedness and easy satisfaction of interest-group agendas make it difficult for decision-makers to withstand pressure for legislative change. Avenues to mitigate these problems through constitutional reforms are explored.

The Benefits of Economic Freedom: A Survey
Artikel (med peer review)Publikation
Berggren, N
Publiceringsår

2003

Sammanfattning

The most ambitious study of its kind, the Economic Freedom Index (EFI), published annually in Economic Freedom of the World, has inspired scholars to examine more closely the effect of economic freedom on economic growth, income equality, and quality of life. Although not without limitations, the EFI supports Adam Smith’s contention that free-market processes, more than any alternatives, can advance wealth and welfare.

Related content: Working Paper No. 4

Working Paper No. 1. The Frailty of Economic Reforms: Political Logic and Constitutional Lessons
Working paperPublikation
Berggren, N
Publiceringsår

2002

Sammanfattning

Why are efficiency-enhancing reforms often frail and subject to being undermined over time? Two theories are examined: public-choice theory, which explains this as the possible result of a need, from time to time, to wipe the slate clean in order to retain productivity in the distribution of favors to interest groups, and a theory which acknowledges that politicians may implement reforms for ideological reasons but still, as time passes, be influenced by the logic of the political and media systems to abandon their initial aspirations. In any case, the demise of reforms is partly a function of the constitutional setting: rules which encourage shortsightedness and easy satisfaction of interest-group agendas make it difficult for decision-makers to withstand pressure for legislative change. Avenues to mitigate these problems through constitutional reforms are explored.

Visa fler

Ratio är ett fristående forskningsinstitut som forskar om hur företagandets villkor kan utvecklas och förbättras.

Sveavägen 59 4trp

Box 3203

103 64 Stockholm

Postgiro: 382621-1

|

Bankgiro: 512-6578