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Working Paper No. 146. Promarket Reforms and Allocation of Capital in India

PublikationWorking paper
Ägarskap, Andreas Högberg, Företagandets villkor, Johan Eklund, Kapitalallokering, Reformer, Sameeksha Desai
Working Paper No. 146.
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Sammanfattning

The government of India initiated pro-market reforms in the 1990s, after almost five decades of socialist planning. These and subsequent policy reforms are credited as the drivers of India’s radical economic transformation. Prior to reforms, private investment was strictly regulated and restricted to certain areas and sectors. There have since been numerous changes in sectors important for investment, which should lead to changes in outcomes of firm-level strategic decision making and investment behavior. By most estimates, India will continue to grow. The purpose of this paper is to investigate changes in investment behavior from the introduction of reforms to current conditions. Reforms changed several institutional frameworks for firm operations, allowing firms to pursue more competitive strategies. Given the importance of ownership in determining firm efficiency and access to capital, we examine the effect of ownership on the performance of Indian firms for the period 1991-2006. We also examine industry differences in capital allocation. We compute a measure of investment efficiency derived from the accelerator principle: Elasticity of capital with respect to output. We examine the effect of various ownership structures on investment behavior and the efficiently of capital allocation across different sectors of the economy. We find that the allocation of capital has been slow to respond to reforms, indicating similar pace of firm responses.

Related content: Pro-market reforms and allocation of capital in India

Desai, S., Eklund, J.E. & Högberg, A. (2009). Promarket Reforms and Allocation of Capital in India. Ratio Working Paper No. 146.

Baserat på innehåll

Working Paper No. 146. Promarket Reforms and Allocation of Capital in India
Working paperPublikation
Desai, S., Eklund, J.E. & Högberg, A.
Publiceringsår

2009

Sammanfattning

The government of India initiated pro-market reforms in the 1990s, after almost five decades of socialist planning. These and subsequent policy reforms are credited as the drivers of India’s radical economic transformation. Prior to reforms, private investment was strictly regulated and restricted to certain areas and sectors. There have since been numerous changes in sectors important for investment, which should lead to changes in outcomes of firm-level strategic decision making and investment behavior. By most estimates, India will continue to grow. The purpose of this paper is to investigate changes in investment behavior from the introduction of reforms to current conditions. Reforms changed several institutional frameworks for firm operations, allowing firms to pursue more competitive strategies. Given the importance of ownership in determining firm efficiency and access to capital, we examine the effect of ownership on the performance of Indian firms for the period 1991-2006. We also examine industry differences in capital allocation. We compute a measure of investment efficiency derived from the accelerator principle: Elasticity of capital with respect to output. We examine the effect of various ownership structures on investment behavior and the efficiently of capital allocation across different sectors of the economy. We find that the allocation of capital has been slow to respond to reforms, indicating similar pace of firm responses.

Related content: Pro-market reforms and allocation of capital in India

Working Paper No. 146. Promarket Reforms and Allocation of Capital in India
Working paperPublikation
Desai, S., Eklund, J.E. & Högberg, A.
Publiceringsår

2009

Sammanfattning

The government of India initiated pro-market reforms in the 1990s, after almost five decades of socialist planning. These and subsequent policy reforms are credited as the drivers of India’s radical economic transformation. Prior to reforms, private investment was strictly regulated and restricted to certain areas and sectors. There have since been numerous changes in sectors important for investment, which should lead to changes in outcomes of firm-level strategic decision making and investment behavior. By most estimates, India will continue to grow. The purpose of this paper is to investigate changes in investment behavior from the introduction of reforms to current conditions. Reforms changed several institutional frameworks for firm operations, allowing firms to pursue more competitive strategies. Given the importance of ownership in determining firm efficiency and access to capital, we examine the effect of ownership on the performance of Indian firms for the period 1991-2006. We also examine industry differences in capital allocation. We compute a measure of investment efficiency derived from the accelerator principle: Elasticity of capital with respect to output. We examine the effect of various ownership structures on investment behavior and the efficiently of capital allocation across different sectors of the economy. We find that the allocation of capital has been slow to respond to reforms, indicating similar pace of firm responses.

Related content: Pro-market reforms and allocation of capital in India

Ratio Working Paper No. 349: Industrial conflict in essential services in a new era – Swedish rules in a comparative perspective
Working paperPublikation
Karlson, N.
Publiceringsår

2021

Publicerat i

Ratio Working Paper

Sammanfattning

This paper examines whether the Swedish regulatory system of dealing with industrial conflicts that affect essential services need an update or reform. Are the existing rules effective in a world where many essential services are upheld by many interdependent agents in complex systems where every single node becomes critical for the functioning of the system, and where the essential service activities could be either private or public? A comparative study is conducted with the corresponding regulatory systems of the United Kingdom, Germany, and Denmark.
The conclusion is that Sweden is a special case. The Swedish protection against and readiness in dealing with societally harmful industrial conflicts in essential services is weaker than in the countries of comparison. Just as in relation to other threats to essential services, it is not sustainable to claim that just because such a threat is not currently present, there would be no need for preparedness.
There are many alternative ways to handle this. Desirable methods should both prevent harmful conflicts from erupting and end conflicts that have grown harmful to society at a later stage. The labour market organisations should have a mutual interest in reforming the rules.

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