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Working Paper No. 173. Monetary and Fiscal Stimuli, Ownership Structure, and China’s Housing Market

PublikationWorking paper
Ägarskap, Företagandets villkor, Kina, Randall Morck
Working Paper No. 173.
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Sammanfattning

In the recent financial crisis, macroeconomic stimuli produced mixed results across developed economies. In contrast, China’s stimulus boosted real GDP growth from an annualized 6.2% in the first quarter of 2009 trough to 11.9% in the first quarter of 2010. Amidst this phenomenal response, land auction and house prices in major cities soared. We argue that the speed and efficacy of China’s stimulus derives from state control over its banking system and corporate sector. Beijing ordered state-owned banks to lend, and they lent. Beijing ordered centrally-controlled state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to invest, and they invested. However, our data show that much of this investment was highly leveraged purchases of real estate. Residential land auction prices in eight major cities rose about 100% in 2009, controlling for quality variation. Moreover, higher price rises occur these SOEs are more active buyers. We argue that these centrally-controlled SOEs overbid substantially, fueling a real estate bubble; and that China’s seemingly highly effective macroeconomic stimulus package may well have induced costly resource misallocation.

Deng, Y., Morck, R., Wu, J. & Yeung, B. (2011). Monetary and Fiscal Stimuli, Ownership Structure, and China’s Housing Market. Ratio Working Paper No. 173.

Baserat på innehåll

Working Paper No. 173. Monetary and Fiscal Stimuli, Ownership Structure, and China’s Housing Market
Working paperPublikation
Deng, Y., Morck, R., Wu, J. & Yeung, B.
Publiceringsår

2011

Publicerat i

Ratio Working Paper

Sammanfattning

In the recent financial crisis, macroeconomic stimuli produced mixed results across developed economies. In contrast, China’s stimulus boosted real GDP growth from an annualized 6.2% in the first quarter of 2009 trough to 11.9% in the first quarter of 2010. Amidst this phenomenal response, land auction and house prices in major cities soared. We argue that the speed and efficacy of China’s stimulus derives from state control over its banking system and corporate sector. Beijing ordered state-owned banks to lend, and they lent. Beijing ordered centrally-controlled state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to invest, and they invested. However, our data show that much of this investment was highly leveraged purchases of real estate. Residential land auction prices in eight major cities rose about 100% in 2009, controlling for quality variation. Moreover, higher price rises occur these SOEs are more active buyers. We argue that these centrally-controlled SOEs overbid substantially, fueling a real estate bubble; and that China’s seemingly highly effective macroeconomic stimulus package may well have induced costly resource misallocation.

Working Paper No. 173. Monetary and Fiscal Stimuli, Ownership Structure, and China’s Housing Market
Working paperPublikation
Deng, Y., Morck, R., Wu, J. & Yeung, B.
Publiceringsår

2011

Publicerat i

Ratio Working Paper

Sammanfattning

In the recent financial crisis, macroeconomic stimuli produced mixed results across developed economies. In contrast, China’s stimulus boosted real GDP growth from an annualized 6.2% in the first quarter of 2009 trough to 11.9% in the first quarter of 2010. Amidst this phenomenal response, land auction and house prices in major cities soared. We argue that the speed and efficacy of China’s stimulus derives from state control over its banking system and corporate sector. Beijing ordered state-owned banks to lend, and they lent. Beijing ordered centrally-controlled state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to invest, and they invested. However, our data show that much of this investment was highly leveraged purchases of real estate. Residential land auction prices in eight major cities rose about 100% in 2009, controlling for quality variation. Moreover, higher price rises occur these SOEs are more active buyers. We argue that these centrally-controlled SOEs overbid substantially, fueling a real estate bubble; and that China’s seemingly highly effective macroeconomic stimulus package may well have induced costly resource misallocation.

Ratio Working Paper No. 349: Industrial conflict in essential services in a new era – Swedish rules in a comparative perspective
Working paperPublikation
Karlson, N.
Publiceringsår

2021

Publicerat i

Ratio Working Paper

Sammanfattning

This paper examines whether the Swedish regulatory system of dealing with industrial conflicts that affect essential services need an update or reform. Are the existing rules effective in a world where many essential services are upheld by many interdependent agents in complex systems where every single node becomes critical for the functioning of the system, and where the essential service activities could be either private or public? A comparative study is conducted with the corresponding regulatory systems of the United Kingdom, Germany, and Denmark.
The conclusion is that Sweden is a special case. The Swedish protection against and readiness in dealing with societally harmful industrial conflicts in essential services is weaker than in the countries of comparison. Just as in relation to other threats to essential services, it is not sustainable to claim that just because such a threat is not currently present, there would be no need for preparedness.
There are many alternative ways to handle this. Desirable methods should both prevent harmful conflicts from erupting and end conflicts that have grown harmful to society at a later stage. The labour market organisations should have a mutual interest in reforming the rules.

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