Choosing One’s Own Informal Institutions

Abstract

In the main, Hayek favored rules that apply equally to all and located such rules in tradition, beyond conscious construction. This led Hayek to attack Keynes’s immoralism, i.e., the position that one should be free to choose how to lead one’s life irrespective of the informal institutions in place. However, it is argued here that immoralism may be compatible with Hayek’s enterprise since Hayek misinterpreted Keynes, who did not advocate the dissolving of all informal rules for everybody. By avoiding this misinterpretation, immoralism can be seen as institutional experimentation at the margin, which Hayek himself favored.

Related content: Working Paper No. 118

Berggren, N. (2009). ”Choosing One’s Own Informal Institutions: On Hayek’s Critique of Keynes’s Immoralism.”Constitutional Political Economy, 20(2): 139-159.

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Choosing One's Own Informal Institutions - Ratio

Choosing One’s Own Informal Institutions

Abstract

Choosing One’s Own Informal Institutions

Abstract

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