Specialisering, marknad och företag
Bjuggren, P-O. (2018). Specialisering, marknad och företag. [Bokrecension av The Problem of Production: A New Theory of the Firm, av P. Bylund]. Ekonomisk Debatt 46(4), 83-86.
Bjuggren, P-O. (2018). Specialisering, marknad och företag. [Bokrecension av The Problem of Production: A New Theory of the Firm, av P. Bylund]. Ekonomisk Debatt 46(4), 83-86.
Utdrag: Nationalekonomin har sedan Adam Smith (1776) en teori om prisbildning på marknader. På marknader är det företag och fysiska personer som interagerar med pris som ledstjärna.Per Bylund tar i sin bok The Problem of Production avstamp i Adam Smiths första kapitel [som handlar specialisering i en knappnålsfabrik] och hävdar att de olika teorier om företaget som tidigare lanserats inte i tillräcklig omfattning uppmärksammat företagets roll för tillväxt i en marknadsekonomi. Han är kritisk mot att företagsteorier ofta utgår från definitioner istället för ett ekonomiskt problem.
Inspirerad av Adam Smith utgår Bylund i sin analys från en förädlingskedja med observerbara specialiserade tillverkningssteg. För att marknadens prismekanism ska kunna fungera så att alla produktivitetsfördelar med specialisering tas tillvara behövs enligt Bolunds terminologi redundans. Med hänvisning till Smiths knappnålsexempel förklarar han detta begrepp.
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2022
Bjuggren, P.O. & Long, V.
This paper decomposes the factors that govern the access and sharing of machine-generated industrial data in the artificial intelligence era. Through a mapping of the key technological, institutional, and firm-level factors that affect the choice of governance structures, this study provides a synthesised view of AI data-sharing and coordination mechanisms. The question to be asked here is whether the hitherto de facto control—bilateral contracts and technical solution-dominating industrial practices in data sharing—can handle the long-run exchange needs or not.
2019
Open innovation has rendered increased interest both in practice and research, and has expanded from dyadic transfers of ideas, to ecosystem levels. Knowledge is at the heart of open innovation, and this paper describes and discusses knowledge-transfer linkages for open innovation. It does so based on a literature review. The paper links together open innovation research with general management research to categorise and discuss linkages among parties in terms of their openness and how they relate to knowledge management. Conclusions indicate that openness needs to be considered in different dimensions that also links to different knowledge management outcomes. The paper’s contribution consists of how it connects open innovation research to the general management literature, and how it builds a practical understanding of how linkages between firms can be categorised to aid firms to consider which mechanisms they may choose and why.
2019
For the corporate business model to be successful, it is important to align the interests of those who control and finance the firm. Corporate law has here an important task to fulfill. It offers a legal framework that can facilitate parties to conclude mutually preferable agreements at low transaction costs. The purpose of this paper is to show how to design corporate law to fulfill this task and apply this knowledge to a Swedish case. A two-dimension model that simultaneously considers both the regulation intensity and the level of default of corporate law is presented. The earlier literature treats these dimensions separately. By adding a transaction cost perspective to our model, we assess different regulatory techniques and examine how the Swedish legislation can be amended to help corporations by offering a standard contract that lowers the transaction costs of contracting. This can be achieved if default rules or standards of opt-out character are combined with other regulatory techniques with lower transaction costs such as opt-in alternatives and menus. We also show how our model can be used in other studies as a tool to analyze the design of legal rules.