The “sugar rush” from innovation subsidies: a robust political economy perspective

Abstract

The governments of most advanced countries offer some type of financial subsidy to encourage firm innovation and productivity. This paper analyzes the effects of innovation subsidies using a unique Swedish database that contains firm level data for the period 1997–2011, specifically informa tion on firm subsidies over a broad range of programs. Applying causal treatment effect analysis based on matching and a diff-in-diff approach combined with a qualitative case study of Swedish innovation subsidy programs, we test whether such subsidies have positive effects on firm performance. Our results indicate a lack of positive performance effects in the long run for the majority of firms, albeit there are positive short-run effects on human capital investments and also positive short-term productivity effects for the smallest firms. These findings are interpreted from a robust political economy perspective that reveals that the problems of acquiring correct information and designing appropriate incentives are so complex that the absence of significant positive long-run effects on firm performance for the majority of firms is not surprising.
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Working Paper No. 383 Insider activism in the forest industry: An empirical public choice analysis

Working paperPublication

Jonas Grafström & Nils Karlson

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Publication year

2025

Published in

Ratio Working Paper Series

Abstract

Insider activism—where bureaucrats use discretionary power to advance own ideological goals—has significant implications for regulatory stability and property rights security. Using the Swedish forestry industry as a case study, the purpose of this study is to investigate if insider activism affects the Swedish forestry sector and how such possible regulatory uncertainty influences economic decision-making. Assembled survey data suggest that forest owners perceive regulatory enforcement as unpredictable, leading to defensive actions such as premature harvesting to preempt restrictive future regulations. To explain these patterns, we apply public choice theory and a game-theoretic approach, demonstrating how bureaucratic drift, regulatory ratcheting, and time-inconsistency problems contribute to persistent distortions in forestry policies. Policy wise, the findings emphasize the need for judicial review, regulatory impact assessments, and clearer legislative mandates to reduce enforcement uncertainty and improve institutional trust. This research advances discussions on bureaucratic incentives, regulatory capture, and legal certainty in environmental policy.

Reviving Classical Liberalism Against Populism

BookPublication

Karlson, N. (2024). Reviving Classical Liberalism Against Populism. Palgrave Macmillan Cham.

Publication year

2024

Published in

Palgrave Macmillan Cham.

Abstract

How can we fight back against the populist threat to liberty, free markets, and the open society?

This open access book by Nils Karlson explores the strategies used by left- and right-wing populists to make populism intelligible, recognizable, and contestable. Karlson argues that to fight back requires the revival of liberalism itself by defending and developing the liberal institutions, the liberal spirit, liberal narratives, and liberal statecraft. The book presents a synthesized explanatory model for how populists promote autocratization through the deliberate polarization of society and traces the ideational roots of the core populist ideas that form a collectivistic identity politics. Written within the tradition of political theory and institutional economics, this book uses a wide variety of sources, including results and analyses from social psychology, ethics, law, and history.

The book is open source and can be downloaded through the link below.

Ratio Working Paper No. 353: From free competition to fair competition on the European internal market

Working paperPublication

Karlson, N., Herold, T. & Dalbard, K.

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Publication year

2022

Published in

Ratio Working Paper

Abstract

This paper investigates whether an increased use and reinterpretation of what has been called “fair competition” has occurred at the expense of “free competition” among the central institutions of the European Union. We are also interested in assessing how frequently these terms have been used by the various EU institutions over time.

We have empirically examined this through a quantitative survey of more than 12,000 public documents, out of totally 242 000 documents containing 630 million words, in the EUR-lex database over the last 50 years, from 1970 to 2020. Our conclusion is that the emphasis of the common policies in the EU is likely to have shifted from free competition and an open market economy to “fair competition” in the sense of a level playing field, in official EU documents, such as treaties, EU acts institutions, preparatory documents relating to EU directives and recommendations including motions and resolutions, case law and more.

The European Commission has been a driving force in this development, followed closely by the European Parliament and subsequently by the Council of Ministers. This change entails a risk that the regulation of the European internal market has shifted so that the dynamics of the internal market and thus the EU’s competitiveness will weaken. The change also entails a centralization of decisions at EU level at the expense of the Member States.

The “sugar rush” from innovation subsidies: a robust political economy perspective

Abstract

The “sugar rush” from innovation subsidies: a robust political economy perspective

Abstract

Absolute income mobility and the effect of parent generation inequality: An extended decomposition approach

No evidence of counteracting policy effects on European solar power invention and diffusion

Similar content

Working Paper No. 383 Insider activism in the forest industry: An empirical public choice analysis

Reviving Classical Liberalism Against Populism

Ratio Working Paper No. 353: From free competition to fair competition on the European internal market