Bureaucrats or Markets in Innovation Policy?

Abstract

How can innovation best be promoted? Based on a major interdisciplinary research program
with a special focus on Sweden, paired with international research, this book shows that targeted
interventions and firm subsidies do not have the intended effects but instead creates policy failures,
government waste and rent-seeking.

Instead, innovation policy should focus on supplying the right competencies and on improving the
institutions of the market economy and the general
conditions for enterprise.

Markets rather than bureaucrats are decisive for
innovation, industrial development and growth.

Sandström, C., Wennberg, K. & Karlson, N. (2019). Bureaucrats or Markets in Innovation Policy? Stockholm: Ratio.

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Bureaucrats or Markets in Innovation Policy?

Abstract

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