Tillväxt och hållbar utveckling i Sverige – fick Lindbeck (1974) rätt?
Grafström, J., Paulson, R., Sandström, C. & Wieslander, A. (2020). Tillväxt och hållbar utveckling i Sverige – fick Lindbeck (1974) rätt? Ekonomisk Debatt, 2020(6), 64-69.
Grafström, J., Paulson, R., Sandström, C. & Wieslander, A. (2020). Tillväxt och hållbar utveckling i Sverige – fick Lindbeck (1974) rätt? Ekonomisk Debatt, 2020(6), 64-69.
2021
Ekon. Debatt, 49, 30-41.
Antalet utvärderingar av ekonomisk politik ökar explosionsartat. Det finns dock få systematiska sammanställningar av de utvärderingar som görs och det saknas kunskap om hur utvärderare skiljer sig åt gällande metoder och slutsatser, inte minst inom näringspolitiken. Vi studerar utvärderingar av 110 näringspoli-tiska insatser 2009–19 genom att granska huruvida valet av utvärderare påver-kar utvärderingarnas resultat. Privata konsulter visar sig vara den vanligaste utvärderaren av näringspolitik och deras utvärderingar skiljer sig från andra utvärderare genom att vara övervägande mer positiva till de utvärderade insat-serna. Vi diskuterar intressekonflikter som kan antas föreligga mellan utvärde-rare, myndigheter, den politiska makten och allmänheten.
Colin, E., Sandström, C., & Wennberg, C. (2021). Utvärderingar av näringspolitik–en intressekonflikt mellan myndigheter, konsultföretag, politik och skattebetalare. Ekon. Debatt, 49, 30-41.
2021
China is currently the world’s largest installer of wind power. However, with twice the installed wind capacity compared to the United States in 2015, the Chinese produce less power. The question is: Why is this the case? This article shows that Chinese grid connectivity is low, Chinese firms have few international patents, and that export is low even though production capacity far exceeds domestic production needs. Using the tools of Austrian economics, China’s wind power development from 1980 to 2016 is documented and analyzed from three angles: (a) planning and knowledge problems, (b) unproductive entrepreneurship, and (c) bureaucracy and government policy. From a theoretical standpoint, both a planning problem and an entrepreneurial problem are evident where governmental policies create misallocation of resources and a hampering of technological development.
2021
Despite high estimated gains of a circular economy implementation, progress on the macro, meso and micro level is sluggish. The purpose of this paper is to examine, from a theoretical economics perspective, how four barriers – technological, market, institutional and cultural – can prevent the implementation of a circular economy. The barriers that currently hinder a circular economy from developing are identified and a mapping of these barriers is performed to understand how they are interdependent and entangled. The conclusion is that even small barriers could stop the emergence of a circular economy. Even though a circular economy is different from our traditional “linear” economy, the theoretical analysis in this paper gives no reason to believe that a circular economy will not follow the same rules as a traditional economy. There will be property rights, rule of law and price signals guiding the economy. If some of the essential parts of a market are lacking, a weaker circular economy than otherwise possible will materialize.
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