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PublicationArticle (with peer review)

Bureaucrats or Markets in Innovation Policy? – a critique of the entrepreneurial state

Abstract

This paper takes stock of recent suggestions that the state apparatus is a central and underappreciated actor in the generation, diffusion and exploitation of innovations enhancing growth and social welfare. We contrast such a view of “the entrepreneurial state” with theories and empirical evidence of the microeconomic processes of innovation in the modern economy which focus on well-functioning markets, free entry and competition among firms, and independent entrepreneurship as central mechanisms in the creation and dissemination of innovations. In doing so, we identify several deficiencies in the notion of an entrepreneurial state by showing that (i) there is weak empirical support in the many hundreds empirical studies and related meta analyses evaluating the effectiveness of active industrial and innovative policies, that (ii) these policies do not take account of the presence of information and incentive problems which together explain why attempts to address purported market failures often result in policy failures, and that (iii) the exclusive focus on knowledge creation through R&D and different forms of firm subsidies ignores the equally important mechanisms of knowledge dissemination and creation through commercial exploitation in markets. We discuss how a more theoretically well-founded focus on the state as investing in knowledge generation and securing the conditions of free and competitive markets will lead to a more innovative economy.

Karlson, N., Sandström, C., & Wennberg, K. (2020). Bureaucrats or Markets in Innovation Policy? – A critique of the entrepreneurial state. Review of Austrian Economics, 34, 91-95. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11138-020-00508-7

Details

Author
Karlson, N., Sandström, C., & Wennberg, K.
Publication year
2020
Published in

Review of Austrian Economics 34, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11138-020-00508-7

Related

  • Professor

    Karl Wennberg

    +46705105366karl.wennberg@ratio.se
  • Professor, Founder and former CEO

    Nils Karlson

    +46708670351nils.karlson@ratio.se

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Publication year

2025

Published in

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Abstract

Configurational research has great promise in entrepreneurship. There are few universal laws or relationships that hold under all circumstances. More often, optimal entrepreneurial outcomes are contingent on many factors. Consequently, configurational analysis using qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) has become increasingly popular. However, methodological research in sociology and political science has raised concerns about possible false positive findings produced by this method. In this editorial, we explore the potential and the common pitfalls of QCA in entrepreneurship research, as well as guidelines for its use.

Working paper

Working Paper No. 383 Insider activism in the forest industry: An empirical public choice analysis

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Publication year

2025

Published in

Ratio Working Paper Series

Abstract

Insider activism—where bureaucrats use discretionary power to advance own ideological goals—has significant implications for regulatory stability and property rights security. Using the Swedish forestry industry as a case study, the purpose of this study is to investigate if insider activism affects the Swedish forestry sector and how such possible regulatory uncertainty influences economic decision-making. Assembled survey data suggest that forest owners perceive regulatory enforcement as unpredictable, leading to defensive actions such as premature harvesting to preempt restrictive future regulations. To explain these patterns, we apply public choice theory and a game-theoretic approach, demonstrating how bureaucratic drift, regulatory ratcheting, and time-inconsistency problems contribute to persistent distortions in forestry policies. Policy wise, the findings emphasize the need for judicial review, regulatory impact assessments, and clearer legislative mandates to reduce enforcement uncertainty and improve institutional trust. This research advances discussions on bureaucratic incentives, regulatory capture, and legal certainty in environmental policy.

Article (with peer review)

Introducing the inverted Icarus paradox in business history – Evidence from David and Goliath in the Swedish telecommunications industry 1981–1990

Eriksson, K.; Lakomaa, E.; Nykvist, R.; Sandström, C.

Publication year

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Published in

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Abstract

Previous research in business and management history has identified the Icarus paradox, which describes how organisations may fall due to overconfidence and hubris. We build upon previous research on paradoxes in business history and introduce the notion of an inverted Icarus paradox. Using rich archival sources coded in a relational database, we show how an entrant firm, Comvik, outmanoeuvred an established government monopoly in the non-market domain from 1980 to 1990, despite inferior resources and a weak market position. The government monopoly Televerket faced an inverted Icarus paradox; it could not leverage its strengths and political connections as they were stuck in a David versus Goliath narrative where public opinion was more sympathetic to the entrant firm Comvik.

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