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PublikationWorking paper

Ratio Working Paper No. 372: Customers’ value-for-money for a regulated service across differen towners

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Sammanfattning

What are the best ownership and governance arrangements for a natural monopoly facility? There are three broad approaches: (a) private ownership, coupled with arms-length public utility regulation; (b) some form of government (central, state, or local) ownership; and (c) customer or community ownership. While there is a substantial literature comparing outcomes under private and public (i.e., government) ownership, there is relatively little literature comparing private and/or government ownership with customer ownership. One of the obstacles of performance comparison is that different businesses may choose a different price-quality trade-off, making direct comparison impossible. In this study we cut through this problem by comparing customer perceptions of value-for-money. The study is based on interviews of more than 600 randomly selected electricity distribution customers in Sweden, approximately 150 in each ownership category (municipal, customer, private, and state). These distributors are subject to an identical regulatory framework. The results show that those owned directly by customers are perceived to deliver significantly more value for money than those owned by the government or by private investors. These results lend weight to the view that a well-governed customer-owned utility may lead to better outcomes than other owners.

Biggar, D., & Söderberg, M. (2024). Customers’ value-for-money for a regulated service across different owners (Ratio Working Paper No. 372). Ratio.

Detaljer

Författare
Biggar, D., & Söderberg, M. (2024). Customers’ value-for-money for a regulated service across different owners (Ratio Working Paper No. 372). Ratio.
Publiceringsår
2024
Publicerat i

Ratio Working Paper Series.

Relaterat

  • Professor

    Magnus Söderberg

    magnus.soderberg@ratio.se

Liknande innehåll

Working paper

A penalization approach for estimating inefficiency in stochastic frontier panel models

Tchatoka, F. D., Söderberg, M., Hakeem, M. A.
Ladda ner

Publiceringsår

2025

Publicerat i

University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy Working Paper.

Sammanfattning

Efficiency analysis is essential for evaluating the performance of entities that deliver essential or standardized services. The estimator proposed by Jondrow et al. (1982) is widely used in this context, but it has been criticized for several shortcomings: it tends to bias inefficiency estimates toward the mean, distorts the distribution, and misrepresents the conditional distribution of inefficiency—especially in cross-sectional data.

Zeebari et al. (2023) propose a regularization-based alternative that aligns sample and theoretical moments; however, this method is primarily designed for cross-sectional applications and does not extend naturally to panel data.

In response, this paper introduces a penalized mode estimator for unit inefficiency in panel data. The estimator accounts for heteroskedasticity in both inefficiency and idiosyncratic errors. A closed-form expression is derived, and Monte Carlo simulations demonstrate its superior performance compared to existing methods. An empirical application using data from electricity providers in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand highlights the practical advantages of the proposed approach.

Artikel (med peer review)

Scale properties and efficient network structures in the Swedish electricity distribution market

Söderberg, M., Vesterberg, M.
Ladda ner

Publiceringsår

2025

Publicerat i

Journal of Regulatory Economics

Sammanfattning

This paper examines the Swedish electricity distribution sector to highlight three key findings. First, we identify significant economies of scale among electricity distribution firms, indicating that larger firms operate more efficiently. Second, we explore alternative market structures and demonstrate that these can substantially reduce the aggregated costs of electricity distribution. Third, we use novel survey data to show that firms perceive the economic incentives for mergers to be insufficient. These findings suggest that policymakers should consider creating a regulatory environment that encourages consolidation and enhance efficiency in the sector.

Artikel (med peer review)

Are CEOs judged on how cost efficient their firms are?

Månsson, K., Qasim, M., Söderberg, M.
Ladda ner

Publiceringsår

2025

Publicerat i

Energy Economics

Sammanfattning

This paper investigates whether executive boards consider firm-specific inefficiencies when they change CEOs in the Swedish electricity distribution sector. Firm-level inefficiencies are calculated using data from all Swedish electricity distributors from 2001 to 2022 and a data envelopment analysis (DEA) approach.

DEA has advantages over standard financial key performance indicators since it controls for heterogeneity in inputs and outputs. It is also frequently employed by energy regulators to calculate relative cost inefficiencies.

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