Gustafsson: Är risken för korruption högre inom kommunala bolag?

Anders Gustafsson, associerad forskare hos Ratio, har i dagarna publicerat en artikel tillsammans med Gissur Ó. Erlingsson, Andreas Bergh samt Emanuel Wittberg. Artikeln utforskar risken för korruption i kommunalt ägda bolag.

Bland slutsatserna står bland annat följande att läsa:

What did this article find then? Employing social network analysis, it uncovered dense social networks and potentially worrisome entanglements between representatives of the owners (members of municipal executive committees and councils), on the one hand, and the boards of the MOEs, on the other. As suggested in previous literature, breaching the arm’s length principle is disturbing for at least two reasons. First, it invites political interests and meddling into the affairs of the enterprises; second, and perhaps more worrying, it facilitates informality in decision making, hence, weakening conditions for accountability.

Artikeln, Municipally Owned Enterprises as Danger Zones for Corruption? How Politicians Having Feet in Two Camps May Undermine Conditions for Accountability,