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PublikationArtikel (med peer review)

Municipally Owned Enterprises as Danger Zones for Corruption? How Politicians Having Feet in Two Camps May Undermine Conditions for Accountability

Sammanfattning

The market-inspired reforms of New Public Management have been particularly pronounced in Swedish local government. Notably, municipally owned enterprises (MOEs) have rapidly grown in numbers. Principal-agent theory gives rise to the hypothesis that the massive introduction of MOEs has impacted negatively on the conditions for accountability in Swedish local government. To study this, social network analysis was employed in mapping networks for 223 MOEs in 11 strategically chosen municipalities, covering a total of 732 politicians. The analysis reveals substantial overlaps between principals (representatives of the ultimate stakeholders, citizens) and agents (the boards of the MOEs). Hence, corporatization of public services seems to imply worrisome entanglements between the politicians who are set to steer, govern, and oversee MOEs on the one hand, and the board members of MOEs on the other. The increasing numbers of MOEs may therefore have adverse effects on accountability in important and growing parts of Swedish local government.

Bergh, A., Erlingsson, G., Gustafsson, A. & Wittberg, E. (2019). Municipally Owned Enterprises as Danger Zones for Corruption? How Politicians Having Feet in Two Camps May Undermine Conditions for Accountability. Public Integrity. DOI: 10.1080/10999922.2018.1522182

Detaljer

Författare
Bergh, A., Erlingsson, G., Gustafsson, A. & Wittberg, E.
Publiceringsår
2019
Publicerat i

Public Integrity

Relaterat


Liknande innehåll

Artikel (med peer review)

Does local government corruption inhibit entrepreneurship?

Wittberg, E., Erlingsson, G. Ó., Wennberg, K.
Ladda ner

Publiceringsår

2024

Publicerat i

Small Business Economics, 62(2), 775-806

Sammanfattning

The dominant ‘sand in the wheels’ view holds that entrepreneurship is strongly inhibited by corruption. Challenging this, the ‘grease the wheels’ view maintains that corruption might increase entrepreneurship in highly regulated economies. We extend the basic predictions of these theories by examining entrepreneurs’ start-up decisions, as well as their location choices, in a seemingly low-corruption environment: Swedish municipalities. Combining a validated index of corruption perceptions in local government with population data on new entrepreneurs, nested logit models reveal that even in a low-corruption setting such as Sweden, perceptions of corruption can deter latent entrepreneurs. We also find that a minority of entrepreneurs relocate from their home municipalities to establish their start-ups elsewhere. Surprisingly and contrary to expectations, these relocating entrepreneurs often relocate from relatively low-corruption municipalities to others that are more corrupt. Implications for future research and public policy are discussed.

Artikel (med peer review)

Subsidy Entrepreneurs: An Inquiry into firms seeking public grants

Halvarsson, D, Gustafsson, A. & Gustavsson Tingvall, P.

Publiceringsår

2020

Publicerat i

Journal of Industry Competition and Trade

Sammanfattning

This paper studies the incentives and characteristics of firms that apply for, and eventually receive, one or multiple governmental grants intended to stimulate innovation and growth. The analysis departs from a contest model in which entrepreneurs are free to allocate their effort between production and seeking grants. The results suggest that highly productive entrepreneurs abstain from seeking grants, moderately productive firms allocate a share of their effort to grant seeking, and low-productivity firms allocate most resources to seeking grants. Due to their efforts in seeking grants, these low-productive subsidy entrepreneurs also have a relatively high probability of receiving the grants. Using comprehensive data over grants from the three largest grant-distributing agencies in Sweden, we find concordant evidence of a negative relation between the probability of receiving a grant and firm productivity. As we go from single- to multiple-grant-supported firms, this negative relation becomes more pronounced.

Artikel (med peer review)

The openness of open innovation in ecosystems

Öberg, C., & Alexander, A.

Publiceringsår

2019

Publicerat i

Journal of Innovation & Knowledge

Sammanfattning

Open innovation has rendered increased interest both in practice and research, and has expanded from dyadic transfers of ideas, to ecosystem levels. Knowledge is at the heart of open innovation, and this paper describes and discusses knowledge-transfer linkages for open innovation. It does so based on a literature review. The paper links together open innovation research with general management research to categorise and discuss linkages among parties in terms of their openness and how they relate to knowledge management. Conclusions indicate that openness needs to be considered in different dimensions that also links to different knowledge management outcomes. The paper’s contribution consists of how it connects open innovation research to the general management literature, and how it builds a practical understanding of how linkages between firms can be categorised to aid firms to consider which mechanisms they may choose and why.

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Nyhetsartikel

Gustafsson: Är risken för korruption högre inom kommunala bolag?

Anders Gustafsson, associerad forskare hos Ratio, har i dagarna publicerat en artikel tillsammans med Gissur Ó. Erlingsson, Andreas Bergh samt Emanuel Wittberg. Artikeln utforskar risken för korruption i kommunalt ägda bolag. Bland slutsatserna står bland...

Publicerat 10 januari 2019
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