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Ekonomers syn på äganderätt, från Adam Smith till nutid

PublikationArtikel (utan peer review)
Per-Olof Bjuggren

Sammanfattning

Synen på äganderätt som den uppfattas av ekonomer har förändrats över tid. På Adam Smiths tid sågs äganderätt som en exklusiv rätt till en sak/egendom som gällde mot alla. Under början av 1900-talet skedde en förändring mot att se äganderätt som en rättslig relation mellan personer. Med en sådan syn försvinner den tidigare distinktionen mellan äganderätt och kontrakt. Ekonomer har kommit att anamma den nya synen. Under senare tid har det vuxit fram en kritik mot ekonomer som visar att den nya synen förbiser viktiga aspekter av äganderätt och har implikationer för transaktioner, stordriftsfördelar och opersonlig handel.

Bjuggren, P.-O. (2024). Ekonomers syn på äganderätt, från Adam Smith till nutid. Ekonomisk Debatt.

Liknande innehåll

Working Paper No. 355: The artificial intelligence (AI) data access regime: what are the factors affecting the access and sharing of industrial AI data?
Working paperPublikation
Bjuggren, P.O. & Long, V.
Ladda ner
Publiceringsår

2022

Publicerat i

Bjuggren, P.O. & Long, V.

Sammanfattning

This paper decomposes the factors that govern the access and sharing of machine-generated industrial data in the artificial intelligence era. Through a mapping of the key technological, institutional, and firm-level factors that affect the choice of governance structures, this study provides a synthesised view of AI data-sharing and coordination mechanisms. The question to be asked here is whether the hitherto de facto control—bilateral contracts and technical solution-dominating industrial practices in data sharing—can handle the long-run exchange needs or not.

A Regulation and Transaction Cost Perspective on the Design of Corporate Law
Artikel (med peer review)Publikation
Bjuggren, P-O. & Almlöf, H.
Publiceringsår

2019

Publicerat i

European Journal of Law and Economics

Sammanfattning

For the corporate business model to be successful, it is important to align the interests of those who control and finance the firm. Corporate law has here an important task to fulfill. It offers a legal framework that can facilitate parties to conclude mutually preferable agreements at low transaction costs. The purpose of this paper is to show how to design corporate law to fulfill this task and apply this knowledge to a Swedish case. A two-dimension model that simultaneously considers both the regulation intensity and the level of default of corporate law is presented. The earlier literature treats these dimensions separately. By adding a transaction cost perspective to our model, we assess different regulatory techniques and examine how the Swedish legislation can be amended to help corporations by offering a standard contract that lowers the transaction costs of contracting. This can be achieved if default rules or standards of opt-out character are combined with other regulatory techniques with lower transaction costs such as opt-in alternatives and menus. We also show how our model can be used in other studies as a tool to analyze the design of legal rules.

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