Utvärderingar av näringspolitik – en intressekonflikt mellan myndigheter, konsult-företag, politik och skattebetalare?

PublikationArtikel (utan peer review)
Christian Sandström, Ekonomisk debatt, Ekonomisk tillväxt, Elias Collin, Karl Wennberg, myndigheter, Tillväxt, utvärderingar

Sammanfattning

Antalet utvärderingar av ekonomisk politik ökar explosionsartat. Det finns dock få systematiska sammanställningar av de utvärderingar som görs och det saknas kunskap om hur utvärderare skiljer sig åt gällande metoder och slutsatser, inte minst inom näringspolitiken. Vi studerar utvärderingar av 110 näringspoli-tiska insatser 2009–19 genom att granska huruvida valet av utvärderare påver-kar utvärderingarnas resultat. Privata konsulter visar sig vara den vanligaste utvärderaren av näringspolitik och deras utvärderingar skiljer sig från andra utvärderare genom att vara övervägande mer positiva till de utvärderade insat-serna. Vi diskuterar intressekonflikter som kan antas föreligga mellan utvärde-rare, myndigheter, den politiska makten och allmänheten.

Colin, E., Sandström, C., & Wennberg, C. (2021). Utvärderingar av näringspolitik–en intressekonflikt mellan myndigheter, konsultföretag, politik och skattebetalare. Ekon. Debatt, 49, 30-41.


Liknande innehåll

Learning from Overrated Mission-Oriented Innovation Policies: Seven Takeaways
BokkapitelPublikation
Henrekson, M., Sandström, C., & Stenkula, M.
Publiceringsår

2024

Publicerat i

Springer Nature.

Sammanfattning

This chapter integrates findings from several different case studies on mission-oriented innovation policies (MOIPs) and makes use of the existing literature to briefly describe three other missions: The War on Cancer, homeownership in the United States, and the Swedish Million Program. Together with the analyses in the other chapters of this volume, seven takeaways regarding mission-oriented innovation policies are developed and described: (1) wicked problems cannot be solved through missions, (2) politicians and government agencies are not exempt from self-interest, (3) MOIPs are subject to rent seeking and mission capture, (4) policymakers lack information to design MOIPs efficiently, (5) MOIPs distort competition, (6) government support programs distort incentives and result in moral hazard, and (7) MOIPs ignore opportunity costs. These seven takeaways are illustrated using the cases described in this chapter and elsewhere in this volume.

Does local government corruption inhibit entrepreneurship?
Artikel (med peer review)Publikation
Wittberg, E., Erlingsson, G. Ó., Wennberg, K.
Publiceringsår

2024

Publicerat i

Small Business Economics, 62(2), 775-806

Sammanfattning

The dominant ‘sand in the wheels’ view holds that entrepreneurship is strongly inhibited by corruption. Challenging this, the ‘grease the wheels’ view maintains that corruption might increase entrepreneurship in highly regulated economies. We extend the basic predictions of these theories by examining entrepreneurs’ start-up decisions, as well as their location choices, in a seemingly low-corruption environment: Swedish municipalities. Combining a validated index of corruption perceptions in local government with population data on new entrepreneurs, nested logit models reveal that even in a low-corruption setting such as Sweden, perceptions of corruption can deter latent entrepreneurs. We also find that a minority of entrepreneurs relocate from their home municipalities to establish their start-ups elsewhere. Surprisingly and contrary to expectations, these relocating entrepreneurs often relocate from relatively low-corruption municipalities to others that are more corrupt. Implications for future research and public policy are discussed.

Visa fler