Berggren, Niclas och Karlson, Nils (2003). ”Constitutionalism, Division of Power, and Transaction Costs.” Public Choice, 117(1-2): 99-124. Länk.


Abstract: According to many democracy theorists, there is an unavoidable trade-off between
constitutionalism and the need for political action. This paper criticizes that belief. Rather, it
argues that a division of power, while sometimes entailing high political transaction costs, can
nevertheless be beneficial and that it is not necessarily the case that a division of power does
entail high transaction costs. The analysis expands the framework of Buchanan and Tullock
(1962). Constitutionalism is thus defended against one of its main perceived deficiencies: its
bringing about gridlock. This does not always happen, and when it does, it is often a good


Related content: Working Paper No. 3